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Abstract 
 
In this paper I offer a conceptualisation of social security and income redistribution 
schemes which highlights the strong overlaps between the two. Indeed, it is virtually 
impossible to disentangle the two in practice. The major conclusion is that any assessment 
of one cannot proceed without taking account of the other. I advocate an integrated 
approach where both types of schemes are considered jointly, especially in assessing major 
reform proposals, or in protecting the poor in the face of increasingly more frequent 
systemic crises. 
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1. Introduction 
 In this paper I define social security broadly as state schemes of contributions and 
benefits in the face of specified contingencies—unemployment, ill health, old age, 
disability, etc. The list can be broadened but the basic conceptual structure is common. In 
return for contributions into a state scheme, individuals or households receive benefits 
when the contingency arises. Much is written about the detail of such schemes—eligibility 
criteria, financial sustainability, implementation problems, etc. These details are being 
affected seriously by periodic systemic crises and medium term global trends. But in this 
paper I want to return to the conceptual core of the arguments surrounding social security. 
In Sections 2 and 3 I discuss whether social security can be disentangled from income 
redistribution, and the extent to which income redistribution is itself a form of social 
security. In Section 4 I argue that it is difficult to separate social security and income 
redistribution from each other, and that it is important to take an integrated view of these 
two types of policy instruments. Sections 5 and 6 provide two illustrations of these 
arguments: recent proposals for reform of Social Security in Mexico, and protection of the 
poor from the impacts of macroeconomic crises. Section 7 concludes. 
 
2. Income Redistribution Through Social Security 
 Consider a society of identical working individuals, all of the same age. Suppose 
there is unemployment risk, in that the firm in which an individual works may face a 
decline in demand and hence the worker may lose his job. If workers are risk averse, they 
will have a demand for unemployment insurance—they would be willing to make 
contributions in return for benefits when unemployment strikes. But who will supply this 
insurance? It could be the firms themselves—who could keep workers on during hard times 
(the benefit) in return for lower wages in good times (the contribution). Or it could be 
insurance firms who could offer unemployment insurance, in principle. There are well 
known problems of insurance markets which prevent such insurance markets from 
operating, or at least from providing complete insurance to workers.  
 
One answer is for the state to step in and offer such insurance, using its powers to 
monitor and to compel participation in order to overcome the informational problems in 
private insurance markets. The critique of this line of argument is not against its logic, but 
rather against the ability of the state to implement the scheme as per the design. Sticking 
with the logic for now, pure insurance requires that contributions and benefits match 
actuarially. While at any instant there may be a surplus or a deficit in the scheme, over the 
long run inflows and outflows are balanced. What happens if they are not? What happens if 
benefits exceed contributions in the actuarial sense? Clearly, this is not then social security 
pure and simple, but redistribution to workers over the long run and on average, from 
somewhere else.  
 
But from where? It could be from general taxation, in which case it is effectively 
redistribution from those who are net tax payers. Or it could be from a more specific 
source, say from a levy on firms’ profits. For both general taxation and firm taxation, we 
have to look of course at the true incidence of the tax once market forces have played out. 
For example, part of the tax on firms could be passed on to workers through lower wages 
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as demand for workers falls. In any event, when contributions and benefits in a social 
security scheme do not match in actuarial terms, the scheme cannot be disentangled from 
income redistribution. 
 
Now take the case where the scheme in question is indeed actuarially balanced, in 
that contributions and benefits match over the long run and on average. In this sense there 
is no (net) redistribution between those in the scheme and those who are not. But suppose 
now that workers within the scheme are not identical—some have higher wages than 
others. The question arises immediately of whether contributions and benefits are or are not 
tied to wages. Of course they could be so tied as to essentially replicate a separate 
actuarially balanced scheme for each wage level.  Indeed this contribution/benefit structure 
is a useful benchmark to have, because any deviation from it must imply redistribution 
across different wage levels. If benefits are uniform but contributions track wages then, in 
the setting where total contributions and benefits are balanced across wages taken as a 
whole, there is redistribution in favor of lower wages. But if contributions are more 
uniformly structured than benefits, then there is redistribution in favor of higher wages. 
 
This redistribution can occur even if workers are identical in terms of wages but 
differ in terms of their degree of risk aversion. In this case the pooled scheme, actuarially 
balanced with identical contributions and benefits, will deliver more in terms of monetary 
equivalent benefit to some workers compared to others. There may not be redistribution in 
terms of actual monetary incomes, but the scheme is redistributive nevertheless—unless a 
different scheme can be implemented for each risk aversion level among workers. 
 
I have developed the above argument, on the difficulties of separating out social 
security from redistribution, using the language of unemployment insurance. But it can 
equally well be developed in the same way across the range of social security 
contingencies. To confirm this, let us briefly look at the case of pensions. Again, start with 
identical workers each of who lives for two periods. There is a steady state with half the 
population old and half young. If the young can work but the old cannot, then there should 
be a demand among the young to save for retirement. Again, the reasons why such markets 
may not exist, or at least meet the demand fully, are well known. There may also be 
failures of information or imagination among the young in taking too optimist a view of 
their prospects when they retire. The state can come in and use its powers to address these 
failures, by compelling contributions from the young and guaranteeing benefits to the old. 
If the contributions and benefits match actuarially (as they would in ―fully funded‖ 
schemes), then there is no net redistribution. But if they do not, if benefits exceed 
contributions, then there must be redistribution of some sort, either from outside the system 
(say taxation on firms, although we would again have to work out the true incidence of this 
tax), or from the currently young to the currently old (in a ―pay as you go‖ system). 
Similarly, even if the scheme was actuarially balanced, there would effectively be 
redistribution if workers differed in their wages when they were young, or if individuals 
differed in their desires to save for old age. 
 
One final point before I move to the next stage of my argument on social security 
and redistribution. Of course, when state social security schemes are introduced, they 
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impinge on existing arrangements at the level of the individual, household, community and 
market. If a social security for retirement is introduced, this will naturally reduce the 
imperatives elsewhere for such a scheme—we might expect individual and household 
savings to fall as a result. This reaction from the market should be factored into any design 
of and, assessment of, social security. Indeed, the policy discourse on macroeconomic 
imbalances between the US and in China is closely related to this. The argument is that US 
households save too little because they have social security, and Chinese households save 
too much because they do not. This imbalance in savings rates, so the argument goes, is 
what translates into the trade imbalances and the consequent financial, monetary and 
political problems (in this view, the Chinese exchange rate as a policy instrument is a side-
show). Thus the essential mismatch between China and the US is the mismatch between the 
coverage of their social security systems. If in fact redistribution is an integral part of social 
security as it is actually implemented, then, this must also be a mismatch in the degree of 
redistribution in the two countries. 
 
3. Social Security Through Income Redistribution 
 Suppose we had a system of public expenditure and taxation that could enforce the 
following outcome: no individual or household is allowed to fall below a socially 
determined minimum level of wellbeing, and income transfers are used to implement this 
rule. When needs differ, as they would for adults and children, or able bodied and disabled, 
then the transfers would differ of course. It is also realized that this rule would have 
incentive effects, and that the revenue would have to be raised by taxation, and this would 
have its own incentive effects. All these factors would have to be taken into account in the 
design of this scheme.  
 
When implemented this scheme for income distribution would have parallels with a 
scheme of social security. It would be directly analogous to social security on the benefits 
side, since by definition all of the contingencies that are currently covered by state social 
security schemes would be addressed, if the contingency were to lead to a fall in wellbeing 
below the social minimum.  The contributions side is less clear since it would not be done 
contingency by contingency, but rather the contributions at any time would come from 
those whose well being is above the socially determined minimum. For the most part these 
would be people who are not currently facing contingencies of unemployment, ill health, 
old age and the like. But they need not be, especially if the base for contribution takes into 
account all sources of income. 
 
 What are the issues that arise with the above conceptualization of income 
redistribution to meet minimum needs? Let me set to one side that the way the revenue is 
raised is left unspecified, and this can be done in a number of ways, the effective tax rate 
being more or less progressive at the top end. Rather, the issues with the expenditure side 
of the scheme described above are those of information, incentives, political economy. 
 
 The informational problems arise in determining the wellbeing of individuals (or 
households)—their needs and the resources they have to meet them. Assessing each 
individual or household at regular intervals, to ensure that those below the threshold are not 
excluded and those above the threshold are not included, is a costly exercise. The response 
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to this can be twofold—indicator targeting or self-targeting. With indicator targeting, a 
relatively easily observable marker—such as unemployment status, age (elderly or infants, 
for example), gender, location or quality of residence, etc.,--is used to determine the 
transfer. The correlation between the indicator and individual wellbeing, determined 
through a small but representative sample survey, is used to modulate the transfers across 
different indicator groups, it being accepted that there will be errors of inclusion and 
exclusion. With self-targeting, the scheme is designed so that only those with relatively low 
wellbeing will apply. Examples are subsidies on low quality grains (which the well off 
would not wish to consume) or public works schemes at relatively low wages (which 
would not be attractive to those already in well paid employment). 
 
 The incentive problems arise because in a scheme such as this there is little to be 
gained for someone with wellbeing below the threshold by exerting effort to get up to the 
threshold ,since the threshold level is met in any case by the scheme. Of course the person 
may not be capable of doing so (for example because of disability), in which case the issue 
does not arise. But if the capacity exists, then the incentive effect must be present—in 
terms of income, the scheme effectively imposes a 100% marginal tax rate on the very poor 
through the structure of its generosity. The response to this is to taper the withdrawl of 
benefits, but this comes at the cost of lower benefits for those below the threshold. 
 
 Finally, there is the political economy problem. A scheme which focuses on 
benefits only for those below the social minimum, which means that those above the 
minimum pay for these benefits through their contributions to general taxation, creates a 
political divide at the social minimum. While some currently above the minimum will 
realize that they could well end up below at some stage and so might support the scheme, 
those who expect on average to be above the minimum are unlikely to have such political 
interest, or at least to have it strongly. The budget for such a scheme, which comes from 
taxation above the social minimum, is thus likely to be low. It is of course well recognized 
that the way to generate this support is to set the threshold for receiving benefits relatively 
high, so as to weave together the interests of the middle strata with those of the very poor. 
 
 The above suggests that departures from the pure scheme of redistribution to 
achieve a social minimum for all will come in three forms: (i) schemes that use indicator 
targeting or self-targeting, (ii) schemes that taper benefits as the social minimum is 
approached but, (iii) schemes that continue the benefits above the social minimum to the 
middle strata. 
 
 In fact, what we see in developed and developing countries alike are a plethora of 
redistributive schemes, with different rationales. In developing countries we see schemes of 
food subsidies (in many cases not well targeted to the poor but reaching to the middle 
strata), public works schemes, a public health system (which often does not deliver service 
to the very poorest), conditional cash transfers (which give families cash in return for some 
action such as keeping children in school), etc. In the formal sector of developing countries, 
in other words those parts where employment relationships are (in principle) governed by 
state regulations, social security schemes familiar from developed countries can be found. 
Public sector workers, in particular, often have a full range of benefits for old age, ill 
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health, loss of employment, etc. It is argued that these schemes are not fully funded and are 
a major charge on the fisc, requiring in effect a transfer from the rest of the population, 
most of which is poorer on average than these public sector workers, through the general 
taxation system. In developed countries of course social security schemes are widespread. I 
have argued in the previous section that these schemes cannot be seen independently of a 
redistributive component. But there also exist schemes which are directly redistributive in 
intent, which directly assess income and resources and make transfers conditional upon 
them. 
 
4. Social Security And Income Redistribution: An Integrated Perspective 
 Let me recap my definitions of social security and income distribution. Social 
security is a state scheme which provides benefits when certain contingencies arise, and 
collects contributions to finance these benefits. Income redistribution is the use of state 
expenditure to transfer resources to individuals or households conditional on their 
characteristics, financed by taxation of individuals, households and firms, also conditional 
on their characteristics. 
 
 I have argued that as currently practiced these two activities of the state are strongly 
overlapping. To the extent that social security schemes are not self financing, and in the 
way that they set contributions and benefits, they in effect redistribute income between 
those in the scheme and those not, and redistribution occurs within the scheme as well. 
And, to the extent that income redistribution schemes use indicators like old age or ill 
health to determine transfers, and in effect finance these transfers from those who are of 
working age or in good health, they are implicitly operating a social security scheme, even 
when there is no explicit scheme with rules and regulations of eligibility criteria, the 
contribution principle, etc. 
 
 The central policy conclusion I want to draw from the above characterization, 
particularly for developing countries, is that we have to look at social security schemes and 
income redistribution schemes as an integrated whole, and not program by program as we 
tend to do now. Unless social security schemes are strictly self-financing, and most are not 
(even when the formal rules say they are, oftentimes this is only because of various 
accounting devices), they are part of the income redistribution system. Indeed, the non-self-
financing nature of many schemes in developing countries makes them highly regressive. 
At the same time, since income transfer schemes are (i) are forced to use indicators to 
target (and these indicators are closely related to contingencies), (ii) should taper benefits 
as the social minimum is approached, and (iii) need to continue transfers some way above 
the social minimum to maintain political support, they share key characteristics with social 
security schemes. 
 
 What would be the broad parameters of such an integrated assessment of income 
redistribution and social security? In my view the anchor has to be the objective of 
achieving a social minimum and reducing inequality beyond this. We can then assess the 
extent to which each scheme, and the schemes as a collectivity, contribute to the objective, 
and what sorts of reforms could better help achieve this objective. This proposition is best 
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discussed with concrete illustrations, and the next two sections provide these specific 
examples. 
 
5. The Levy Proposal for Social Security Reform in Mexico 
An important recent contribution to the debate on social security in developing 
countries is the book by Santiago Levy (2007), Good Intentions, Bad Outcomes: Social 
Policy, Informality and Economic Growth in Mexico. The book combines a sharp logic, 
backed up by a multitude of data sources, some of them quite novel, and with the bottom 
line of a big, bold policy conclusion which, even if one disagrees with it, is bound to set the 
terms of the debate in Mexico and beyond. 
 
 Here is the argument of the book in a nutshell. It proceeds in a number of steps. 
Mexican law makes the crucial identification of an employer-employee, boss-worker 
relationship (la relacion obrero-patronal). The relationship is defined in law and 
interpreted in courts. A worker who is in such a relationship is called a ―salaried worker‖. 
Levy estimates that 57% of Mexico’s labor force comprises salaried workers. Of the rest, 
4% are unemployed, and 39% are non-salaried workers. The non-salaried labor force 
comprises a number of categories—self-employed and  comisionistas, and sub-categories 
within these. 
 
 Employers are required by law to register salaried workers for social security. A 
registered worker receives a bundled set of benefits, financed by contributions from the 
state, the worker and (mainly) the employer. Many employers do not register their workers 
for social security. Levy estimates this number to be 19% of the labor force. Thus 38% of 
the labor force is salaried workers who are registered for social security. Levy calls this the 
formal sector. He groups together the non-salaried workers (39%), and the illegal, 
unregistered, salaried workers (19%) under the label of informal sector. 
 
 Non-salaried workers in also enjoy benefits of the type available to salaried 
workers. Over the years the government has introduced these to narrow the gap between 
the social security schemes available to salaried workers and, initially, nothing at all for 
non-salaried workers. Levy calls these social protection benefits. But unlike social security 
in the formal sector they are (i) conditional on not being a registered salaried worker, (ii) 
unbundled, and (iii) completely financed by the government. Thus they are (i) valued more 
by informal sector workers per peso spent, and (ii) a subsidy on working in the informal 
sector.  
 
Thus, Levy argues, the informal sector is larger than it would otherwise be, given 
the pattern of social security and what he calls social protection but what I have referred to 
as income redistribution (there are other schemes under the income redistribution heading, 
such as the conditional cash transfer program Progresa-Oportunidades, which gives money 
to the mother in return for keeping children in school). In Levy’s view, for reasons which 
he details, this relatively large informal sector holds back dynamism and growth. 
 
What is interesting from the point of view of my argument is that the two forms of 
redistribution—through the social security system and through the social protection 
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system—are progressive in their own terms, but because the former is conditioned on 
employment status of a particular type while the latter is not, their joint presence alters the 
incentives for employment in that status. Levy’s bold proposal is to replace both systems 
by a single overall redistributive scheme which transfers incomes to those in need by direct 
assessment, without conditioning on employment status of a particular type. Whatever our 
verdict on the details of Levy’s analysis, and it is not without its critics, it is nevertheless an 
example of an attempt to view social security and income redistribution in an integrated 
manner, and is to be welcomed for that reason. 
 
6. Illustration: Protecting the Poor Against Macroeconomic Crises 
 In a series of papers and presentations over the past two years, I have argued that 
we should use the opening and the awareness created by the global financial crisis of 2008 
to prepare ourselves for protecting the poor against the next macro crisis. The concern is 
motivated by (i) how long it took the international community to get its act together to 
provide support for social protection this time around (some of these schemes are only now 
getting off the ground, just as the crisis has abated from its peak) and (ii) the next crisis 
may be very different from the current one (recall that the crisis before the financial crisis 
was one of soaring food and fuel prices globally), and we do know when it will strike. 
 
 The twin uncertainties about macro level crises that developing countries face—
uncertainty about crisis type and uncertainty about crisis timing—frame the issues that 
arise in designing a response for protecting the poor against future crises. The fact that the 
crisis could be one of a number of types (climatic, infectious disease, collapse of global 
demand for a key industry like tourism, unrest in neighboring countries, etc) requires that 
our ex ante design be comprehensive. The fact that we do not know when a crisis will 
strike, and indeed when it will recede, requires that the social protection system as a whole 
be flexible, both in the expansion phase when needed, and in the contraction phase when 
the crisis passes. 
 
 On this basis, I have proposed that we do systematic ―stress testing‖ of the 
collection of social protection schemes, to see how the system as a whole would react to 
crises of different types, and what gaps and vulnerabilities are revealed in protecting the 
poor. Analogously to the stress testing of the financial system, I propose that we imagine 
macro level shocks to the economy and see how each scheme would respond according to 
its own rules and regulations, and therefore how the system as a whole would cope. 
Technical and political assumptions will have to be made in conducting such an exercise—
on the latter, whether for example the increased budget needed for this or that program will 
indeed be made available. Put another way, we can produce alternative scenarios under 
various assumptions and these can be the basis for a discourse on reform of the system to 
achieve comprehensiveness and flexibility. 
 
 In the detailed discussions in my papers, I illustrate issues that might arise if such 
an exercise is conducted for food subsidies and for public works schemes. But where would 
social security schemes fit in? Unemployment insurance is an obvious one to take for a 
macro crisis whose effect manifests itself through a collapse in formal sector 
unemployment. Assessment done by the World Bank for some Eastern European and Latin 
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America countries indicate that this dimension of social security seems to work quite well 
in mitigating the impact of macro level crises, provided of course that the budget is made 
available to pay the increased unemployment benefit. A similar argument applies to 
schemes like India’s National Rural Employment Guarantee, which offers at employment 
at relatively low wages at public works schemes. If agricultural employment were to 
collapse because of climatic factors, then this scheme would provide social protection for 
able bodied members of rural households. Although not formally a social security scheme 
(there is no workers’ contribution to this for example)  it seems to act in a similar 
redistributive manner to more formally constituted schemes of unemployment 
compensation. The question is again whether the budget will be made available as 
employment on public works expands. The device used in India is to make the guarantee a 
justiciable one, so that the government has pressure on it to find the budget. 
 
 Outside of unemployment insurance, it is not clear that formal social security 
schemes are as useful in helping the poor to cope with macro level crises. In principle 
public health insurance could help when an infectious disease becomes an epidemic. But 
particularly for climate induced crises that can destroy crops and property, it is not clear 
that retirement schemes or disability benefits can help much. It can be argued of course that 
this is not surprising since that is not their intent. But since some social security schemes 
can help at times of macro crises, this emphasizes the point that we need to take an 
integrated view of social security and income support schemes, and stress test both to 
identify gaps in coverage and speed of response. 
 
7. Conclusion 
 In this paper I offer a conceptualization of social security and income redistribution 
schemes which highlights the strong overlaps between the two. Indeed, it is virtually 
impossible to disentangle the two in practice. The major conclusion is that any assessment 
of one cannot proceed without taking account of the other. I advocate an integrated 
approach where both types of schemes are considered jointly, especially in assessing major 
reform proposals, or in protecting the poor in the face of increasingly more frequent 
systemic crises. 
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